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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHf ; 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case N9. 870259-CA 
v. : 
RICHARD C. BAIRD, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Utah (fode Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1986) after a trial in the Fourtn District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether reasonable suspicion existed, based upon 
the Trooper's articulated observations, justifying a brief 
investigative stop of defendant's vphielp tlo more closely inspect 
the displayed registration decal. 
2. Whether defendant was detained beyond the scope of 
the investigative detention. 
3. Whether defendant failed to preserve the inventory 
search issue for appeal. 
CQUJSIIIIITIQNAL PROVISIONSr STATUSES, ANP RULES 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
(1896): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982) provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Richard C. Baird, appeals from a judgment 
and conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1986). Defendant was convicted on May 20, 1987, after a bench 
trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Juab County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 9, 1987 at approximately 3:45 p.m., Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was on regular patrol on 
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Interstate 15 about seven miles north of N^phi in Juab County, 
Utah (R. 49, 61, 98). Trooper Mangelson's vehicle was parked 
parallel to the Interstate facing south as he was clocking 
vehicles by radar and checking inspection ^nd registration 
stickers as vehicles passed (R. 49f 99). tfhe Trooper observed a 
late model Cadillac with Arizona plates travelling northbound at 
the speed of 56 M.P.H. (R. 99). As the vehicle passed, the 
Trooper observed that the registration decal on the license 
plates did not appear to be valid (R. 50, 99). The Trooper 
pulled out and proceeded north on Interstate 15 to more closely 
observe the decal (R. 50, 99). 
After following the vehicle for approximately one mile, 
the Trooper observed that the decal clearly displayed the month 
of December, but he could not discern whether the registration 
year was 1986 or 1987 (R. 50, 62-3, 65, 100). If the year of 
registration was 1986, the registration was expired (R. 64). If 
it was 1987, it was valid. I&. The Trooper determined that it 
was necessary to stop the vehicle to more closely inspect the 
registration decal (R. 50, 99). 
Stopping directly behind the suspect vehicle, Trooper 
Mangelson exited his car, approached the rear of the suspect 
vehicle, and observed from a distance of 10 to 15 feet that the 
registration decal was valid (R. 57, 67). As he approached the 
rear of the car, the Trooper also observed new tires and new air 
shocks on the suspect vehicle (R. 57, 101). Passing by the rear 
window, he noticed a bumper jack, a lug wrench, and a twisted off 
locking gas cap on the rear seat (R. 57, 58, 101). 
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Suspicious whether the driver was in proper possession 
of the vehicle, the Trooper asked the driver for his license and 
registration after explaining the initial purpose of the stop (R. 
52-3, 102f 104). The driver, later identified as defendant 
produced a Utah driver's license and an Arizona registration slip 
(R. 52, 102)• 
During the brief conversation with defendant, the 
Trooper detected a strong odor of fresh marijuana eminating from 
defendant's vehicle (R. 53, 104) . He also noticed a key ring in 
the ignition without a gas cap key (R. 52, 102). In response to 
brief questioning regarding the ownership of the vehicle, 
defendant stated that the had borrowed the vehicle from a girl in 
Arizona, that he had wrecked his vehicle in Pheonix, that he did 
not know the current address of the owner, and that he did not 
know the location of his wrecked vehicle (R. 53, 103, 104). 
The Trooper asked defendant if he was carrying any 
drugs, alcohol, or weapons in the vehicle (R. 53, 104). 
Defendant replied, "no". Id.. The Trooper then asked defendant 
if he would mind if he looked through the vehicle. Id.. Defendant 
responded, "I told you there is nothing in the car and I don't 
want you looking." I&. The Trooper returned to his patrol car 
to check on the drivers' license and registration information. 
Id. 
Upon request, Police dispatch responded that the 
vehicle had not been reported stolen but that defendant's 
driver's license was suspended (R. 53-4, 104-5). Defendant was 
arrested for driving on a suspended license (R. 54, 105). 
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Because defendant's vehicle could not remain on the freeway for 
safety and liability reasons, a wrecker was called to tow the 
vehicle to the Public Safety Building in Nephi (R. 55, 106) . 
In accordance with the written policy of the Utah 
Highway Patrol, an inventory search was conducted on defendant's 
vehicle (R. 55, 107f 110). Fourteen bales of crushed marijuana 
weighing 165 pounds were discovered in the trunk of defendant's 
vehicle (R. 57-9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trooper Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant's vehicle was unregistered based upon his clear 
observation that defendant's vehicle did not appear to display a 
current registration decal. Thus, the Trooper was justified in 
making a brief investigatory stop to more closely inspect the 
registration decal. 
Once suspicion was alleviated, the Trooper did not 
improperly extend the investigative detention by approaching 
defendant to explain the purpose of the stop and that defendant 
was free to leave. As the Trooper approached and conversed with 
defendant, the Trooper again had a reasonable suspicion based 
upon his plain view observations that defendant may be in 
possession of a stolen vehicle and/or illegal drugs. 
Defendant failed to raise the inventory search issue in 
the trial court below and cannot now raise the issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TROOPER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
JUSTIFYING AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that Trooper Mangelson did 
not have a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable factsf 
justifying an investigative stop of defendant's vehicle to check 
the registration decal. He further asserts that reasonable 
suspicion, if any, evaporated when the Trooper exited his vehicle 
and observed the valid registration decal. Thus, he argues that 
defendant was unreasonably detained against his State and Federal 
constitutional rights and that all evidence subsequently seized 
was inadmissible. 
The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse. 
440 U.S. 648 (1979) declared that the stopping of a vehicle by a 
police officer constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Likewise, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that such a stop is a seizure 
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. State v. 
Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). The United States and Utah 
Constitutions do not prohibit all seizures, but rather, they 
require a police seizure to be reasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
Citing Terry v. Ohio, this Court in State v. Truiillo. 
stated that "a police officer, in appropriate circumstances and 
in an appropriate manner, may approach a person for purposes of 
investigating suspected criminal behavior even though there is 
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not probable cause to make an arrest." Such appropriate 
circumstances have been codified in Utah Cdde Ann. S 77-7-15 
(1982) which states: 
(Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds.) A peace officer 
may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address, and an 
explanation of his actions. 
See sl££ United States v. Recaldq, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 
1985): United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Statq v, Swanigartr 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). The reasonable 
suspicion standard also applies to investigative stops involving 
vehicles. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
In order to justify a seizure based on reasonable 
suspicion, an officer must point to specific, articulable facts 
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a person had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. Florida v., Royer* 460 
U.S. 491, 499 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). This Court in Trujillo 
acknowledged that "a trained law enforcement officer may be able 
to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would 
be wholly innocent to the untrained observer•" T£iljJ.llfl# 739 
P.2d at 88. 
In the instant case, Trooper Mangelson suspected that 
the vehicle which defendant was driving was not legally 
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registered.1 The fact articulated in support of reasonable 
suspicion was the Trooper's observance of defendant's vehicle for 
approximately one mile in which he could not clearly discern a 
current registration decal. The Trooper acted reasonably in 
effectuating a brief investigatory stop to more closely observe 
the decal. Clearly, the Trooper's actions were not arbitrary nor 
discriminatory and cannot be said to engender the evils 
associated with random license and registration checks. See 
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 688 (1979). Public interest 
dictates that a police officer must be constitutionally permitted 
to briefly stop a vehicle which objectively appears unregistered. 
Once stopped, the Trooper exited his police car, 
approached the rear of defendant's vehicle, and observed that the 
registration was current (R. 57. 67). The purpose of the initial 
stop being satisfied, the detention could not continue any longer 
than necessary to inform defendant the reason for the stop and 
that he was free to leave. See United States v. Luckett* 484 
F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973). However, before the Trooper could 
explain the reason for the stop, reasonable suspicion again arose 
as the Trooper approached defendant. 
1
 The Utah Motor Vehicle Act provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive 
or move or for an owner knowingly to permit 
to be driven or moved upon any highway any 
vehicle of a type required to be registered 
hereunder which is not registered. . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-18 (1981). The Act further provides that a 
motor vehicle owned and operated by a nonresident of Utah must be 
duly registered in another state. Utah Code Ann. § 41-l-19(f) 
(Supp. 1987). Such a violation of the Act constitutes a class B 
misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-142 (Supp. 1987). 
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After exiting the police car. Trooper Mangelson noticed 
new tires and new air shocks on defendant's vehicle (R. 57, 101). 
As he passed the rear window, he noticed a jumper jack, a lug 
wrench, and a twisted off locking gas cap oifi the rear seat (57f 
58, 101) . He further observed a key ring iiji the ignition without 
a gas cap key (R. 52, 102). Finally, the Trooper detected a 
strong odor of fresh marijuana eminating frc^ m the vehicle as he 
conversed with defendant (R. 53, 104). 
Based upon the observations and inferences noted above, 
combined with Trooper Mangelsonfs twenty ye^rs of law enforcement 
experience, a reasonable person could suspecbt either of the 
following: first, defendant did not have lawful possession of 
the vehicle as evidenced by the twisted off locking gas cap and 
absence of a gas cap key; second, defendant was transporting a 
large quantity of marijuana as evidenced by the strong odor of 
marijuana and the new tires and air shocks. Reasonable suspicion 
again being present, the Trooper was justified in further 
investigating the ownership of the vehicle, whether defendant had 
proper possession of the vehicle, and whether defendant may be 
transporting marijuana. 
In response to the Trooper's inquiry, defendant stated 
that he had borrowed the car from a girl in Arizona, that he had 
wrecked his car in Pheonix, that he did not know the present 
address of the owner, and that he did not kriow the location of 
his wrecked car (R. 53, 103, 104). Defendants response failing 
to satisfy the Trooper's suspicions, the Trooper returned to his 
vehicle to run a stolen vehicle and driver'^ license check. 14. 
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Upon receiving information from police dispatch that defendant's 
driver's license was suspended, Trooper Mangelson had probable 
cause to arrest defendant (R. 53-4, 104-5). 
In summary, applying Fourth Amendment standards to the 
case at hand, Trooper Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion based 
upon his observations while following defendant's vehicle that 
defendant was in violation of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act which 
requires a current car registration. Once the Trooper's 
suspicions were satisfied, he acted reasonably in approaching 
defendant to explain the purpose of the stop* Before the Trooper 
could explain the stop, reasonable suspicion was again aroused by 
further observations and detections while approaching and 
conversing with defendant. 
Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court 
case of Delaware v. Prouse* 440 U.S. 648 (1979) is analagous to 
the present case. In Prouse, a police officer stopped a vehicle 
in order to check the driver's license and car registration. Id. 
at 650. Prior to the stop, the officer did not observe any 
traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court held: 
that except in those situations in which 
there is at least articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or 
that an automobile is not registered, or that 
either the vehicle or an occupant is 
otherwise subject to seizure for violation of 
law, stopping an automobile and detaining the 
driver in order to check his driver's license 
and the registration of the automobile are 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. . . . 
Id. at 663. 
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The present case is distinguishable from prouse in that 
Trooper Mangelson was not arbitrarily stopping vehicles for spot 
checks of automobile registrations. Rather, Trooper Mangelson, a 
twenty-year veteran of law enforcementf observed that the vehicle 
which defendant was driving did not clearly display a current 
registration decal (R. 50, 62-3, 65, 100). This observation was 
made after following defendant's vehicle fot approximately a 
mile. 14. Under Prouse* no further justification need exist if 
the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that an automobile 
is unregistered. 440 U.S. at 663. 
Defendant also cites jSjtate v, Car^ena, 714 P.2d 674 
(Utah 1986) as factually similar to the case at hand. In 
Carpena, a police officer observed a slow-moving vehicle with 
Arizona plates at 3:00 a.m. in a residential area where there had 
been a recent rash of burglaries. After following the car for 
three blocks, the officer initiated a stop. 
In contrast, Trooper Mangelson based his stop on the 
clear observation that defendant's vehicle did not appear to 
display a valid registration decal. The Trooper's stop was not 
based on a mere "hunch" or "feeling" as defendant argues. 
Instead, the stop was based upon the objective belief that a 
motor vehicle violation existed. Therefor^, the investigative 
stop to more closely observe the registration decal was not an 
unconstitutional detention. 
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POINl1 II 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DETAINED BEYOND THE SCOPE 
OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
Defendant argues that even if the initial stop was 
justified, an illegal detention occurred after the Trooper 
observed the valid decal and continued to walk toward defendant's 
vehicle. Defendant's argument lacks reason. 
In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 
1979), the Ninth Circuit ruled that absent further justification, 
a detention must not continue longer than necessary to satisfy 
the initial purpose of the stop. In Luckett* a police officer 
detained a pedestrian to run a warrant check after the police 
officer had completed a jaywalking citation. Id. at 90. 
In the present casef Trooper Mangelson continued to 
walk toward defendant's vehicle after he observed the valid 
registration decal. If nothing else, common courtesy justified 
Trooper Mangelson's approaching defendant to explain the reason 
for the stop and that defendant was free to leave. It would be 
unreasonable to have required the Trooper to freeze in his tracks 
as he noticed the valid decal and waive defendant on without the 
courtesy of an explanation for the stop. The fact that the 
Trooper chose to verbalize rather than signal to defendant that 
he was free to leave should not be considered an improper 
extension of an otherwise valid stop. 
As discussed in Point I, reasonable suspicion was again 
raised as the Trooper observed the twisted off locking gas cap 
and other items in plain view as he approached defendant. Thus, 
a further investigative detention was justified to inquire 
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whether defendant was in proper possession of the vehicle. The 
evidence seized pursuant to the investigation and subsequent 
arrest was therefore not the fruit of an illegal detention. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT IN THfe TRIAL COURT 
AND THUS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE 
SEARCH ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
INVENTORY 
Defendant argues that even assuming the stop and 
subsequent arrest were valid, the search of his car was not an 
inventory search, or at least, was improperly conducted. 
However# defendant failed to object to the search at both the 
suppression hearing and trial. In fact, tpe entire emphasis of 
defendant's suppression motion was based 0^1 his claim of an 
improper stop, not an improper search (R. [L3, 14, 17-23) • 
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that a defendant 
waives his right to challenge a ground for suppressing the 
evidence when he fails to object at trial. State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). In Carter, the Court stated as 
follows: 
where a defendant fails to assert a 
particular ground for suppressing unlawfully 
obtained evidence in the trial court, an 
appellate court still not consider that ground 
on appeal. 
i£. (Emphasis added) . The Court further hoted that: 
n[T]he failure to assert a particular ground 
in a pre-trial suppression motion operates as 
a waiver of the right to challenge the 
subsequent admission on that ground." 
!&• (Citations omitted.) 
The facts in the present case ar^ identical to those in 
:e v. Constantinp, 7 32 P.2d 125 (Utah 1^87) where the Supreme 
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Court refused to reach the defendant's inventory search issue 
because it was raised for the first time on appeal. 
Exceptions to the waiver doctrine have been limited to 
special circumstances. The Supreme Court in Carter explained 
that: 
"Generally, there is no justification for not 
presenting all available grounds in support 
of a motion to suppress, and in the absence 
of special circumstances an appellate court 
will not rule on grounds not addressed in the 
trial court." . . . 
Carter at 660-61. Defendant fails to allege any special 
circumstances or explanations justifying an exception to the 
waiver doctrine. Accordingly, this Court should find that the 
inventory search issue was not raised in the trial court below 
and cannot therefore be considered for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED this / £ ^ cTay of April, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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